Department colloquium: Jack Copeland (University of Canterbury)
Title: The Mathematical Objection: Turing, Gödel, and Penrose on the Mind.
Speaker: Jack Copeland (Distinguished Professor, University of Canterbury)
Abstract: Is what the mind does always computable? What Turing called the 'Mathematical Objection' to machine intelligence suggests not. Turing's subtle and interesting treatment of the Mathematical Objection reveals important aspects of his view of mind. He is often portrayed as a card-carrying computationalist, but he would I think disagree with the simple claim that the mind is a Turing machine (or an equivalent computational system).
Turing believed, unlike Roger Penrose, that the Mathematical Objection has no force at all against the suggestion that machines can display human-level intelligence—but not because the objection is necessarily wrong in its core claim that what the mind does is sometimes uncomputable.
This discussion of Turing's views on computability and the mind will be preceded by a short general introduction to the man and his work.