Full Security of Quantum Key Distribution From No-Signaling Constraints

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Full Security of Quantum Key Distribution From No-Signaling Constraints. / Masanes, L. ; Renner, R.; Christandl, Matthias; Winter, Andreas; Barrett, J.

In: I E E E Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. 60, No. 8, 2014, p. 4973-4986.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Masanes, L, Renner, R, Christandl, M, Winter, A & Barrett, J 2014, 'Full Security of Quantum Key Distribution From No-Signaling Constraints', I E E E Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 60, no. 8, pp. 4973-4986. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.2014.2329417

APA

Masanes, L., Renner, R., Christandl, M., Winter, A., & Barrett, J. (2014). Full Security of Quantum Key Distribution From No-Signaling Constraints. I E E E Transactions on Information Theory, 60(8), 4973-4986. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.2014.2329417

Vancouver

Masanes, L, Renner R, Christandl M, Winter A, Barrett J. Full Security of Quantum Key Distribution From No-Signaling Constraints. I E E E Transactions on Information Theory. 2014;60(8):4973-4986. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.2014.2329417

Author

Masanes, L. ; Renner, R. ; Christandl, Matthias ; Winter, Andreas ; Barrett, J. / Full Security of Quantum Key Distribution From No-Signaling Constraints. In: I E E E Transactions on Information Theory. 2014 ; Vol. 60, No. 8. pp. 4973-4986.

Bibtex

@article{b731a5cb7c20465aa12840ea53716f2c,
title = "Full Security of Quantum Key Distribution From No-Signaling Constraints",
abstract = "We analyze a cryptographic protocol for generating a distributed secret key from correlations that violate a Bell inequality by a sufficient amount, and prove its security against eavesdroppers, constrained only by the assumption that any information accessible to them must be compatible with the non-signaling principle. The claim holds with respect to the state-of-the-art security definition used in cryptography, known as universally-composable security. The non-signaling assumption only refers to the statistics of measurement outcomes depending on the choices of measurements; hence security is independent of the internal workings of the devices - they do not even need to follow the laws of quantum theory. This is relevant for practice as a correct and complete modeling of realistic devices is generally impossible. The techniques developed are general and can be applied to other Bell inequality-based protocols. In particular, we provide a scheme for estimating Bell-inequality violations when the samples are not independent and identically distributed.",
author = "L. Masanes, and R. Renner and Matthias Christandl and Andreas Winter and J. Barrett",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1109/TIT.2014.2329417",
language = "English",
volume = "60",
pages = "4973--4986",
journal = "IEEE Transactions on Information Theory",
issn = "0018-9448",
publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers",
number = "8",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Full Security of Quantum Key Distribution From No-Signaling Constraints

AU - Masanes,, L.

AU - Renner, R.

AU - Christandl, Matthias

AU - Winter, Andreas

AU - Barrett, J.

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - We analyze a cryptographic protocol for generating a distributed secret key from correlations that violate a Bell inequality by a sufficient amount, and prove its security against eavesdroppers, constrained only by the assumption that any information accessible to them must be compatible with the non-signaling principle. The claim holds with respect to the state-of-the-art security definition used in cryptography, known as universally-composable security. The non-signaling assumption only refers to the statistics of measurement outcomes depending on the choices of measurements; hence security is independent of the internal workings of the devices - they do not even need to follow the laws of quantum theory. This is relevant for practice as a correct and complete modeling of realistic devices is generally impossible. The techniques developed are general and can be applied to other Bell inequality-based protocols. In particular, we provide a scheme for estimating Bell-inequality violations when the samples are not independent and identically distributed.

AB - We analyze a cryptographic protocol for generating a distributed secret key from correlations that violate a Bell inequality by a sufficient amount, and prove its security against eavesdroppers, constrained only by the assumption that any information accessible to them must be compatible with the non-signaling principle. The claim holds with respect to the state-of-the-art security definition used in cryptography, known as universally-composable security. The non-signaling assumption only refers to the statistics of measurement outcomes depending on the choices of measurements; hence security is independent of the internal workings of the devices - they do not even need to follow the laws of quantum theory. This is relevant for practice as a correct and complete modeling of realistic devices is generally impossible. The techniques developed are general and can be applied to other Bell inequality-based protocols. In particular, we provide a scheme for estimating Bell-inequality violations when the samples are not independent and identically distributed.

U2 - 10.1109/TIT.2014.2329417

DO - 10.1109/TIT.2014.2329417

M3 - Journal article

VL - 60

SP - 4973

EP - 4986

JO - IEEE Transactions on Information Theory

JF - IEEE Transactions on Information Theory

SN - 0018-9448

IS - 8

ER -

ID: 130286945