Transmission and wind investment in a deregulated electricity industry

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Transmission and wind investment in a deregulated electricity industry. / Maurovich-Horvat, Lajos; Boomsma, Trine Krogh; Siddiqui, Afzal S.

In: I E E E Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2015, p. 1633-1643.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Maurovich-Horvat, L, Boomsma, TK & Siddiqui, AS 2015, 'Transmission and wind investment in a deregulated electricity industry', I E E E Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 1633-1643. https://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2014.2367107

APA

Maurovich-Horvat, L., Boomsma, T. K., & Siddiqui, A. S. (2015). Transmission and wind investment in a deregulated electricity industry. I E E E Transactions on Power Systems, 30(3), 1633-1643. https://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2014.2367107

Vancouver

Maurovich-Horvat L, Boomsma TK, Siddiqui AS. Transmission and wind investment in a deregulated electricity industry. I E E E Transactions on Power Systems. 2015;30(3):1633-1643. https://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2014.2367107

Author

Maurovich-Horvat, Lajos ; Boomsma, Trine Krogh ; Siddiqui, Afzal S. / Transmission and wind investment in a deregulated electricity industry. In: I E E E Transactions on Power Systems. 2015 ; Vol. 30, No. 3. pp. 1633-1643.

Bibtex

@article{1019826249834ca6a4a50a25653c636e,
title = "Transmission and wind investment in a deregulated electricity industry",
abstract = "Adoption of dispersed renewable energy technologies requires transmission network expansion. Besides the transmission system operator (TSO), restructuring of electricity industries has introduced a merchant investor (MI), who earns congestion rents from constructing new lines. We compare these two market designs via a stochastic bi-level programming model that has either the MI or the TSO making transmission investment decisions at the upper level and power producers determining generation investment and operation at the lower level while facing wind power variability. We find that social welfare is always higher under the TSO because the MI has incentive to boost congestion rents by restricting capacities of transmission lines. Such strategic behavior also limits investment in wind power by producers. However, regardless of the market design (MI or TSO), when producers behave {\`a} la Cournot, a higher proportion of energy is produced by wind. In effect, withholding of generation capacity by producers prompts more transmission investment since the TSO aims to increase welfare by subsidizing wind and the MI creates more flow to maximize profit.",
author = "Lajos Maurovich-Horvat and Boomsma, {Trine Krogh} and Siddiqui, {Afzal S.}",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1109/TPWRS.2014.2367107",
language = "English",
volume = "30",
pages = "1633--1643",
journal = "IEEE Transactions on Power Systems",
issn = "0885-8950",
publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Transmission and wind investment in a deregulated electricity industry

AU - Maurovich-Horvat, Lajos

AU - Boomsma, Trine Krogh

AU - Siddiqui, Afzal S.

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - Adoption of dispersed renewable energy technologies requires transmission network expansion. Besides the transmission system operator (TSO), restructuring of electricity industries has introduced a merchant investor (MI), who earns congestion rents from constructing new lines. We compare these two market designs via a stochastic bi-level programming model that has either the MI or the TSO making transmission investment decisions at the upper level and power producers determining generation investment and operation at the lower level while facing wind power variability. We find that social welfare is always higher under the TSO because the MI has incentive to boost congestion rents by restricting capacities of transmission lines. Such strategic behavior also limits investment in wind power by producers. However, regardless of the market design (MI or TSO), when producers behave à la Cournot, a higher proportion of energy is produced by wind. In effect, withholding of generation capacity by producers prompts more transmission investment since the TSO aims to increase welfare by subsidizing wind and the MI creates more flow to maximize profit.

AB - Adoption of dispersed renewable energy technologies requires transmission network expansion. Besides the transmission system operator (TSO), restructuring of electricity industries has introduced a merchant investor (MI), who earns congestion rents from constructing new lines. We compare these two market designs via a stochastic bi-level programming model that has either the MI or the TSO making transmission investment decisions at the upper level and power producers determining generation investment and operation at the lower level while facing wind power variability. We find that social welfare is always higher under the TSO because the MI has incentive to boost congestion rents by restricting capacities of transmission lines. Such strategic behavior also limits investment in wind power by producers. However, regardless of the market design (MI or TSO), when producers behave à la Cournot, a higher proportion of energy is produced by wind. In effect, withholding of generation capacity by producers prompts more transmission investment since the TSO aims to increase welfare by subsidizing wind and the MI creates more flow to maximize profit.

U2 - 10.1109/TPWRS.2014.2367107

DO - 10.1109/TPWRS.2014.2367107

M3 - Journal article

VL - 30

SP - 1633

EP - 1643

JO - IEEE Transactions on Power Systems

JF - IEEE Transactions on Power Systems

SN - 0885-8950

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 135535586