On the supersingular GPST attack
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- On the supersingular GPST attack
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The main attack against static-key supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) is the Galbraith-Petit-Shani-Ti (GPST) attack, which also prevents the application of SIDH to other constructions such as non-interactive key-exchange. In this paper, we identify and study a specific assumption on which the GPST attack relies that does not necessarily hold in all circumstances. We show that in some circumstances the attack fails to recover part of the secret key. We also characterize the conditions necessary for the attack to fail and show that it rarely happens in real cases. We give a link with collisions in the Charles-Goren-Lauter (CGL) hash function.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Journal of Mathematical Cryptology |
Volume | 16 |
Issue number | 1 |
Pages (from-to) | 14-19 |
ISSN | 1862-2976 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2022 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Andrea Basso and Fabien Pazuki, published by De Gruyter.
- isogenies, modular invariants, supersingular elliptic curves
Research areas
ID: 284298949