

Identification (1st case), avoiding Lagrange multipliers exponential families

Standard setting: $\Phi, H, D \dots$

A strategy y^* is **robust** if $\Phi(x, y^*)$ is a constant independently of $x \in X$.

Theorem (identification). If (x^*, y^*) satisfy:
 $x^* \in X, y^* = \hat{x}^*, y^*$ robust (say $\forall x \in X: \Phi(x, y^*) = h$)
then the game is in equilibrium and x^* and y^* are
optimal strategies: $H(x^*) = H_{\max}, R(y^*) = R_{\min}, H_{\max} = R_{\min} = h$

Proof. $H(x^*) = \Phi(x^*, \hat{x}^*) = \Phi(x^*, y^*) = h$

$$R(y^*) = \sup_x \Phi(x, y^*) = h$$

As $R(y^*) = H(x^*)$, result follows by minmax ineq. \square

Key application: Classical case. \mathcal{A} alphabet,
 $E: \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ "energy function", $\bar{E} \in \mathbb{R}$ given mean energy,
 $X = \{P \in M_+^*(\mathcal{A}) \mid \langle E, P \rangle = \bar{E}\}$, the preparation.

Problem: Find MaxEnt distribution. Solution: Search
among the **exponential family** $\mathcal{E}(X) = \{P \in M_+^*(\mathcal{A}) \mid \hat{P} \text{ robust}\}$

Clearly, any code \mathcal{z} of the form $\mathcal{z} = \alpha + \beta E$ is robust.
As \mathcal{z} must be a code, $\sum e^{-\mathcal{z}_i} = 1$, hence

$$\alpha = \ln Z(\beta) \text{ with } Z(\beta) = \sum e^{-\beta E_i} \text{ (} Z \text{ the partition function)}$$

So consider $(P_\beta, \mathcal{z}_\beta)_{\alpha, \beta \text{ s.t. } Z(\beta) < \infty}$ with $\mathcal{z}_\beta = \hat{P}_\beta$ and

$\mathcal{z}_\beta = \ln Z(\beta) + \beta E$ and choose β s.t. $P_\beta \in X$ - and you are done. \square